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The immigration of Coptic communities from Egypt to the United States is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon that dates back to the 1950s. Compared to other groups
of Middle East Christian descent (notably those coming from Syria and Lebanon),
Coptic communities are quite new in the United States. Attempts made by the
Coptic diaspora to create political organizations and to sway on U.S. foreign policy
is even more recent. The ﬁrst major Coptic organization was created in 1972. But
it’s only after the 1990s that Copts actively sought to inﬂuence American foreign
policy and joined the ﬁght for international religious freedom launched by evangel-
ical Christians and human rights activists. The endorsement of the facially neutral
language of international religious freedom allowed them to attract greater atten-
tion and to give more visibility to the issue of the “persecution” of Copts. The
atrocities perpetrated since 2012 by the Islamic State against religious minorities in
the Middle East have made the mobilization of American Copts look even more
legitimate and urgent.
Various scholars of Egyptian Coptism (S. Tadros, 2013) have shown how the
fear of violent Islamists has led the Coptic communities in Egypt to support the
Church hierarchy and—if only tacitly—the authoritarian regimes of Presidents
Moubarak and now Sissi. The historic confrontation among Islamists, the military
and authoritarian rulers, has limited the space of possible political interventions
for Copts. Not only did it prevent the opening up of Coptic communities and the
emancipation of the faithful from the Church hierarchy, it also hindered the for-
mation of a discourse of Egyptian Coptism based on the notion of equal citizen-
ship, rather than on the concept of persecuted minority. This article shows that, in
a comparable—although different—way, the claims of Copts living in the United
States have been caught up in the national culture war between liberals and conser-
vatives and in the political feud between Democrats and Republicans. The rap-
prochement of some of the most prominent Coptic organizations in the United
States with conservative politicians such as Marco Rubio has allowed for a stronger
and more visible advocacy campaign. However it has also contributed to the
absorption of the speciﬁc claims of Copts into the broader media and political bat-
tle for Middle Eastern Christians. Due to the ideological polarization that charac-
terizes the American political scene, it has been difﬁcult for Copts living in the
Unites States to articulate claims that break away from the humanitarian call to
protect persecuted minorities and to emphasize, instead, a political discourse of
equal citizenship for Egyptians.
After brieﬂy presenting the main characteristics of the Coptic diaspora in the
United States and of its attempts at gaining political clout since the 1990s, I will
discuss the impact of the election of President Obama and of the 2011 Egyptian
revolution on the rhetoric and strategy of the main Coptic organizations in the
United States. I also examine the changing relation between Copts in Egypt and
Copts in the United States.
The article is based on interviews with leaders of Coptic organizations in the
United States, Coptic scholars based in the United States, and Coptic activists and
intellectuals in Egypt. It also draws upon the analysis of the documents produced
by Coptic lobbies, and observation of their major conferences.
The Coptic diaspora in the United States
It is only recently that the existence of the Coptic Church and the claims of Copts
living in the United States have become well known to the broader American pub-
lic. Until well after the 9/11 attacks, “to most North Americans, a Christian Church
of Arabic speaking immigrants [was] a puzzling enigma” (Botros, 2006, p. 180).
The Coptic diaspora living in the United States has attracted relatively less atten-
tion from social scientists than other groups of immigrants from the Middle East.
Although scholars have thoroughly examined some particular aspects of the reli-
gious practice or political activism of some Coptic communities, no comprehensive
study of the history and sociology of Copts living in the United States has been
published yet in English. Existing literature generally emphasizes the important
diversity in ways of life, relations to the Church and links to Copts in Egypt, modes
of identiﬁcation, and degree of socialization with the broader Egyptian diaspora in
the United States (In the absence of data collection on the subnational identity of
immigrants, the exact number of Copts living in the United States is a matter of
debate. Estimates range from 91,200 to 750,000 (see Brinkerhoff, 2012, p. 8). While
the term diaspora may be interpreted in various ways and applied differently, Cop-
tic organizations active in the United States and Europe resort to the term. If the
term were used to deﬁne a community that seeks to maintain an identity despite
the distance from the territory of origin, it would adequately describes the activities
of most Coptic associations in the United States. There are two main usages of the
term diaspora in the contemporary literature. One focuses on the notion of conti-
nuity and on the hope of return to the land of origin. The other emphasizes ideas
of hybridization and reinvention of an identity (Dufoix, 2011). The Coptic dias-
pora combines elements of these two approaches, as it seeks to maintain a strong
relationship with Egypt, while integrating into the American society and inﬂuenc-
ing public debate. The pessimistic understanding of the diaspora as a divine pun-
ishment is not central in American Copts’ self-representation.
The Coptic Orthodox Church plays a key role in the consolidation of the con-
nection between Copts in the United States and Egypt (Brinkerhoff & Riddle,
2012). Since the ﬁrst signiﬁcant wave of Coptic immigration to the United States
(in the 1950s), the Church has been an important center around which the sociali-
zation of Copts took place. (There are about 200 Coptic Orthodox Churches in the
United States and the estimated number of adherents is between 350,000 and
450,000). In particular, churches have had a key role in diaspora philanthropy and
in creating and maintaining the link with Copts in Egypt. The degree of acceptance
of the Church as an entity that is mainly responsible for philanthropy and as the
only intermediary between Egypt and the United States varies across generations
and years spent in the United States. As shown by Jennifer Brinkerhoff, Copts who
have lived in the United States for up to 10 years are much more likely than those
who have lived there for more than 25 years to want to support “any Egyptian who
[is] in need,” as opposed to “only [their] fellow Copts” (Brinkerhoff, 2013, p. 11).
The Church has traditionally upheld a paciﬁst and conservative discourse regard-
ing the role of the Coptic diaspora. While lay activists have organized to denounce
the discriminations against Copts, the Church has remained faithful to a celebra-
tory message, praising the “miracle of survival” of the Coptic Church and refusing
to describe Egyptian Christians as victims (Botros, 2006, p. 192). Bishops of
churches of North America usually insisted on how immigration should be a theol-
ogizing experience not a politicizing one. Church leaders in Egypt have tradition-
ally seen diaspora activism as a headache and as needlessly politicized. Pope
Shenouda—pope of Alexandria and patriarch of the Sea of St. Mark from 1971 to
2012—very clearly criticized the political opposition of the diaspora and opposed
any U.S. interference in Egyptian affairs (Al Banna, 1998, Chap. 3) A 2012 exten-
sive survey led by Coptic Orphans has delineated the most salient characteristics of
the Coptic diasporas: the role of the Church in maintaining cohesion and connec-
tion with Egypt; the precedence of the Coptic diaspora’s philanthropic engagement
over its political engagement in Egypt; the relative low level of investment (com-
pared to other diasporas such as Lebanese), owing to, possibly, the difﬁcult political
context in Egypt (Brinkerhoff & Riddle, 2012, p. 18).
Copts living in the United States have begun to organize politically through
associations and pressure groups in the 1970s. Shawky Karas (1928–2003), a pro-
fessor of mathematics at the Southern Connecticut University and originally from
the Egyptian province of Sohag, created the American Coptic Association (ACA)
in 1972 to raise awareness about the rise of discrimination against Copts living in
Egypt in the American public and among American policy makers. ACA organized
several protests outside the White House during the ofﬁcial visit of President Sadat
in 1975. Despite Pope Shenouda’s calls to moderation and warnings against dias-
pora activism, President Sadat blamed these demonstrations on the pope. The rela-
tionship between the Egyptian president and the Coptic clerical establishment
quickly degenerated, and in 1981, Sadat ordered the exile of Pope Shenouda at the
Monastery of St. Bishoy in the Nitrian Desert. Shenouda’s exile made the ACA
more active and more vocal. Raﬁk R. Attia, the president of the Boston Chapter of
the ACA, convinced members of Congress to write to President Mubarak to seek
the liberation of the pope (Zaki, 2010). In other words, the years 1970 and 1980
represent the forming years of the diaspora activism for Copts in the United States.
Since then, other organizations have been created between the mid 1990s and
the early 2000. A wide difference in the agenda defended by these groups, fragmen-
tation and lack of collaboration and access to limited resources, have often charac-
terized the landscape of Coptic lobbying in the United States, despite the tendency
of some commentators to inﬂate their importance and their representativeness.
Coptic orphans (created in 1992) is a nonproﬁt organization based in the United
States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Egypt that focuses on provid-
ing resources, networks, and education to children who have lost a parent. It
emphasizes the struggle against poverty and the empowerment of young girls.
Other organizations are dedicated to informing the American public about the sit-
uation of Copts in Egypt, and advocating for equal rights for Copts. The Coptic
Assembly of America (CAA) deﬁnes its claims through the language of human
rights and equal citizenship and has published the views of a wide range of experts,
from liberals to conservatives. Created in 2006 by the millionaire businessman
Cameel Halim, CAA was the ﬁrst organization that really sought to emulate
the strategy of other American pressure groups (through the promotion of multi-
ple views, efforts to build long-term access and inﬂuence, etc.). By contrast, the
National American Coptic Assembly, a small group led by Morris Sadek—the
translator and promoter of the movie “the Innocence of Muslims”—spreads a
violently Islamophobic and bigoted message. The innocence of Muslims is an
Islamophobic 14-minute movie that depicts the life of Mohammed in derogatory
and demeaning ways. Initially uploaded on YouTube in July 2012, the movie trig-
gered massive demonstrations and violence throughout the Muslim world. The
ﬁlm was produced by Nakoula Basseley Nakoula (born 1975), an Egyptian born
U.S.-Coptic citizen, who, prior to the release of the movie, had been charged sev-
eral times for possession of drugs and bank fraud. While Nakoula had no real his-
tory of Coptic activism, Morris Sadek aggressively promoted the ﬁlm on the blog
of the National American Coptic Assembly. The U.S. Copts Association, founded
by Michael Mounir in 1996, and Coptic Solidarity, founded in 2010 and led by
Magdi Khalil and Adel Guindy, are other small organizations that combine a ﬁerce
critique of Islamism and the Muslim Brothers with calls for full citizenship for
Copts. The tension among Coptic leaders in the United States over strategy and
vision are best exempliﬁed by the split that occurred in 2005 between Michael
Mounir, chairman of the U.S. Copts Association and Magdi Khalil, a prominent
Coptic journalist and activist. In December 2005, Michael Mounir traveled to
Egypt and met with ofﬁcials such as the director of the Egyptian General Intelli-
gence Service, Lt. Gen. Omar Suleiman. Magdi Khalil criticized this visit as evi-
dence of cooptation of Mounir by the Egyptian state.
Described at the end of the 1990s as coming down to “three or four guys with a
fax machine” (Rowe, 2001, p. 90; 2010), they have long suffered from a lack of pro-
fessionalism and a form of amateurism (Hanna, 2013). Samuel Tadros, an expert
of Coptic issues at the Hudson Institute, describes U.S. Coptic organizations as
“one men shows”—that is, organizations that are very much centered around the
personality of its founding members but that do not succeed in creating a collective
dynamics nor at ﬁnding grassroots supports. Their main instrument of action is
the creation of an Internet website, where they share analyses and information, but
that often privileges sensationalist stories and alarmist analyses about the world-
wide conspiracy of Islamists and Obama supporters. In S. Tadros’s view, this
comes from the fact that most Copts came to the United States “with a baggage,”
the memory of political oppression and sectarian violence, and with a lack of polit-
ical experience. Since 2000, the Coptic lobby has grown in size and in capacity
building. It has also beneﬁted from the increasing role of social media and the out-
reach of Christian satellite channels such as the Way or Media for Christ. The
diversiﬁcation within the movement and the radicalization of some groups in the
post–9/11 context has made the Coptic lobby at once more visible and less effective
than other pressure groups.
Up until the beginning of the revolution in Egypt in 2010, an important obstacle
to the success of these organizations was the lack of support or even the ﬁerce
opposition from Copts living in Egypt. The ofﬁcial discourse of many Copts, acti-
vists, intellectuals, and politicians in Egypt during the Mubarak era was to reject,
publically at least, all attempts to deﬁne Copts as a “minority” that should seek
“protection” from foreign powers. On the contrary, they insisted on their belong-
ing to the Egyptian nation and criticized the work of Copts in the diaspora as
harmful. In 1998, Edward Ghali El-Dahabi, a Coptic member of the People’s
Assembly stated that “those who are trying to incite foreigners to interfere in
Egypt’s internal affairs are, in fact, stabbing Copts in the heart” (El-Din, 1998).
Copts’ struggle against “persecution” and rapprochement with the
conservative right
In the 1990s, both Christian evangelical lobbies and human rights organizations
put pressure on legislators and policy makers, calling for U.S. action to improve
the condition of Christian minorities in the Sudan and in China. The theme of the
“persecuted Church,” and calls against the persecution of Christians in Muslim
countries, were spread by numerous books written by prominent evangelical writ-
ers and lobbyists (Castelli, 2005). In this context, two Republicans, Rep. Frank R.
Wolf (Virginia) and Sen. Arlen Specter (Pennsylvania), introduced in 1997 the
Freedom From Religious Persecution Bill that planned immediate sanctions
against governments that do not respect religious minorities. Then secretary of
state Madeleine Albright and a number of ofﬁcials from the state department did
not endorse the project, fearing that such a bill would create a dangerous hierarchy
among rights. The business community also raised objections about how sanctions
may negatively impact business relations with the targeted countries. A modiﬁed
version of the bill was ﬁnally signed into law in October 1998. International Reli-
gious Freedom Act (IRFA) creates an Ofﬁce of International Religious Freedom
(IRF), reporting to the State Department, and a bipartisan Commission on IRF,
dependent on the White House. The main activity of the commission is to write
annual reports assessing the state of violations to religious freedom in the world
and identifying each year “countries of particular concern” (CPC). On this basis,
the commission advises the president to undertake a number of possible actions
(ranging from economic sanction to cancelling academic exchange programs).
Presented in the form of the neutral language of human rights, the ﬁght for the
legislation on International Religious Freedom in the United States and in Europe
has long been a highly politicized and ideologically loaded agenda. During the
Cold War, secular human rights activists and Christian evangelical organizations
turned religious freedom into a common cause in their ﬁght against Communism
(Moyn, 2012). Earlier on, in the 19th century, Protestant missionaries in Egypt
acted as passionate advocates for religious freedom, as they hoped that this would
open up a more favorable space for proselytizing and conversions of both Coptic
Christians and Muslims (Mahmood, 2012; Sharkey, 2011).
Coptic activists living in the United States acted as key supporters and advocates
of IRFA, and allied themselves with Christian or conservative organizations that
played a central role in spreading the theme of persecution, such as Christian Soli-
darity International, or the Center for Religious Freedom (CFR) of the Hudson
Institute, or Freedom House. The book by CFR’s expert Paul Marshall, Their Blood
Cries Out (1997), quickly became a canonical book for Western Christian activists
committed to international political action (Castelli, 2005, McAllister, 2008). The
alliance of Coptic activists with the Christian evangelical movement is best exem-
pliﬁed by the letters published in the Washington Times on April 12, 1998, by
Michael Mounir, then leader of the International Coptic Federation, and Reverend
Keith Roderick, Episcopal priest of the Diocese of Springﬁeld and head of the Coa-
lition for the Defense of Human Rights Under Islamicization. The letter presented
the condition of the Copts and advocated for the bill against religious persecution.
Although Copts all agree on the need to advocate for religious freedom in Egypt,
they hold different views on the extent to which the United States should intervene
in Egyptian politics and on how the Coptic claims should be framed. According to
Magdi Khalil from Coptic solidarity, Copts should deﬁne themselves as a minority
that gets inspiration from the legal repertoire of minority rights in order to claim
special protection (Mahmood, 2012). Other Coptic activists, in Egypt and in the
United States, vehemently contested this view and argued, on the contrary, that
Copts should advocate for full equality and claim recognition not as a special
minority but only as equal citizens (Ibrahim, 1998). Samir Murqus, a prominent
Coptic intellectual who was appointed in 2012 as a presidential advisor under Pres-
ident Mohamed Morsi explained his opposition to the use of the category of
minority and criticized IRFA as a form of imperialism. In the United States, other
Coptic activists, without necessarily sharing the harsh criticisms developed by
Murqus toward Western intervention, also chose the concept of equal citizenship
over the notion of minority rights.
This debate echoes an older discussion that took place in the early 20th century
at the time of the struggle for independence (P. Sedra, 2007; M. Tadros, 2012).
During the discussions regarding the drafting of the ﬁrst constitution in 1923,
Coptic members of the Wafd Party rejected the deﬁnition of Copts as minority
that should beneﬁt from proportionate representation and argued for the recogni-
tion of full and equal citizenship to all Egyptians, regardless of their religion.
After 2001, in a context marked by the post–9/11 rise of Islamophobia and the suc-
cess of neoconservative views on democratization of the Middle East under the Bush
administration, a number of Coptic activists and organizations in the United States
participated in the strengthening of Coptic nationalism. They promoted a revivalist
view of national purity focused on the continuity between pre-Islamic Christianity
and contemporary Coptism. The insistence on the use of Coptic language and the pro-
motion of a Coptic ﬂag were essential aspects of the development of Coptic national-
ism after 2000 in the United States. Stories reported by some Coptic leaders nourished
the Islamophobic narratives of right-wing pundits (Bangstad, 2014) and fed into what
Paul Sedra calls the “persecution industry” (P. Sedra, 2012, September 11), based on
think tanks, media, blogs, and conservative lobbies. Coptic organizations under the
Bush administration, however, did not clearly lobby for direct intervention against the
regime of Mubarak. They mainly pleaded for an increase of immigration quotas and
warned policy makers against the danger of a possible rapprochement with Islamists.
For U.S. Copts (and to some extent even for Egyptian Copts), the 2008 election
of President Obama and the changes it implied in U.S. foreign policy toward the
Muslim world represented a turning point almost as signiﬁcant as the revolution
of January 25, 2010. Coptic associations of the diaspora quickly became disen-
chanted with what they saw as a dangerous benevolence of the Obama administra-
tion toward Islamists and a lack of interest for discussion on religious minorities.
As a matter of fact, despite the continuous rise of right-wing Islamophobic rheto-
ric, the terms of the public debate about Islamism and the Middle East have signiﬁ-
cantly shifted in the foreign-policy establishment under the Obama administration.
Amalgamation of Islam, Islamism, and Extremism is not the norm any more. The
conceptual vocabulary used by ofﬁcial institutions became much more accurate
and less orientalist. Think tanks such as Brookings, Carnegie Endowment, CSIS
(Center for Strategic and International Studies) have played a key role in develop-
ing and promoting accurate knowledge and diverse views about political changes
in the Middle East, drawing upon the expertise of both Western and Middle East-
ern scholars. Signiﬁcant funding coming from Gulf countries to support research
on Islamist movements has played an essential role in redeﬁning the research
agenda of Washington foreign-policy circles (Lipton et al., 2014). In this context,
American Copts have continued seeking support among conservative groups and
think tanks. Conservative politicians and organizations appropriated the cause of
Middle East’s Christians for many different reasons: sincere conviction and faith
solidarity, belonging to the evangelical Zionist movement, the memory of the ﬁght
of Christian conservatives against communists, or as a way to add yet another rea-
son to justify their hate for the Obama administration. After 2008, the boundary
between the political speech of Copts from the diaspora and the Egyptian domestic
press became less rigid. A few newspapers such as Al-Masry al-Youm or Al-Youm
al-Sabe’a have published op-eds and articles from Coptic activists in the United
States. The Coptic diaspora capacity to shape U.S. policy toward Egypt or Egyptian
policy toward Copts, however, remained very limited.
Redeﬁning a strategy in a polarized context
In the aftermath of the January 2011 revolution, a few attempts were made in the
Egyptian diaspora to build transfaith organizations that would promote political
and economic rights and equal citizenship rather than focus on the grievances of
one speciﬁc community. The Egyptian-American Rule of Law Association
(EARLA), the Ad Hoc Coalition to Defend the Egyptian Revolution, and the
American-Egyptian Strategic Alliance are examples of such initiatives (Kusc¸u,
2012, p. 133). But the immediate post-revolution enthusiasm for transfaith activ-
ism didn’t last long. For Copts in the diaspora and Copts in Egypt, the revolution
of January 25, 2011, and the coup of July 3, 2013, have had two major impacts on
the condition of Egyptian Copts: an unquestionable rise of sectarian violence and
an increased publicity of the issue of Coptic rights. Even though sectarianism is far
from a new issue in Egyptian political history, almost all Coptic activists, whatever
their differences in terms of political preferences, seem to agree that sectarianism
has drastically increased. They all blame the policy implemented by former presi-
dent Morsi for this worsening of their security. They resent Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) for resorting to a very divisive discourse and for their attempt
at offering them a regime of protection that basically resembled the millet partner-
ship (Sedra, 2012, September 13). The explanation given for the rise of sectarian-
ism varies. Most Copts evoke the “Islamist vendetta” launched by MB supporters
against Copts in retaliation for their assumed support for Sissi. Members of the
Maspero Youth Union (MYU) put more emphasis on the responsibility of the gov-
ernment, the Ministry of Interior, and the police. The MYU is a lose coalition of
young Coptic activists born after the revolution, in the Spring 2011, named after a
protest that took place outside the Maspero State Television building. The MYU
protests against the violence against Copts but also advocates equal citizenship and
independence from the Church authority. Other analysts underline the enduring
weight of social relations and customs. Two new phenomena have particularly
worried Copts about their future in Egypt, the increase of forced evacuations and
of blasphemy charges (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 2013). After 2011,
violence against Copts in Egypt has kept growing, with mob violence, the burning
of churches, and accusations of blasphemy. Forced evacuations from villages have
also become more common, due to mob violence after various conﬂicts between
Muslim and Coptic individuals that often start with a disagreement over very mun-
dane issues (S. Tadros, 2014).
If their evaluation of Sissi’s rule varies, Copts usually refrain from openly criti-
cizing the military for fear that a destabilization of the fragile status quo may ren-
der their situation even worse. Nonetheless, most Coptic intellectuals and activists
acknowledge that they do not believe the new regime will contribute to an
improvement of their status either. They see the new constitution as reinforcing
the status quo rather than as planting seeds for change. They continue to assess
rather negatively the strategy of the Obama administration and show more sympa-
thy toward Republican politicians. The words of Republican Rep. Michele Bach-
mann, during her September 2013 trip to Egypt, in support of the military and the
Copts, and against the Muslim Brotherhood, were very well received by the Coptic
communities. In spite of all this, many Copts continue to see the 2011 revolution
as a positive event that opened up a new space for political discussion and that
gave a much bigger visibility to the Coptic issue. The gap between the diaspora
and Copts in Egypt has narrowed. Whereas, before 2011, Coptic groups living in
the United States were much more vocal than their coreligionists in Egypt, now
Copts in both places vehemently denounce violence and discrimination.
While Copts in both the United States and Egypt have become more vocal, Cop-
tic organizations in the diaspora are still in the process of deﬁning their identity
and of reﬁning their strategy to get access and inﬂuence. The context, though, does
not seem in favor of an immediate increase in the inﬂuence of American Coptic
organizations. The two main sources of leverage they had before 2008 and 2010
have disappeared. This leverage used to be based on (a) the interventionist ratio-
nale of a forced democratization of the Middle East, promoted by neoconservatives
during the Bush administration and (b) the illusion that Mubarak cared about
Western public opinion and would defend human rights. Under the Obama
administration, Coptic organizations in the United States have found much less
interest in supporting their agenda. As for Sissi, he has shown no interest in U.S.
public opinion. In this context, American Coptic organizations have chosen to
consolidate their alliance with conservative groups and to build alliances with other
Arab Christian associations. These alliances tend to strengthen their anti-Islamist
and pro-Sissi rhetoric.
The anti-Islamist and promilitary turn was visible in the last two annual confer-
ences held by Coptic Solidarity, in June 2013 and June 2014. Speakers at these
events included Lebanese-American “expert” on terrorism and anti-Islamist Walid
Phares; former head of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
Nina Shea; and right-wing senator Ted Cruz. Presentations addressed the reality of
the rise of sectarian violence and discrimination against Copts, but they also pro-
posed very general and alarmist images of the treatment of women and ethnic
minorities in the Muslim world. All speakers condemned the lack of leadership
and strategy of the West and of the Obama administration. Most of the remarks
made at these conferences suggest that solely responsible for the persecution are
the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists. No mention of the social, structural, and
legal aspects of discriminations was made, and the state apparatus was never iden-
tiﬁed as a perpetrator of violence. In other words, the Coptic issue was mostly
deﬁned as an ideological matter, based on the genuine and essentialized hatred of
all Islamists toward Copts. Rep. Frank Wolf, a long-time supporter of the cause of
Copts, called the members of the Coptic diaspora to unite with other minorities,
such as the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Ahmedi, and the Bahai. “It’s not enough,
he said, to do meetings and op-eds. You have to take this into the political arena.”
He also cited the Jewish American community as a model of efﬁcient and united
political action. This call lumps together, in an odd manner, the Eastern Syriac
Catholic Church, led by the Patriarch of Babylon, based in Baghdad, with the
Ahmadiyya, an Islamic religious movement founded in British India at the end of
the 19th century, and the Bahai faith, a monotheistic faith that emphasizes the
unity of all humanity and that was founded in Persia at the end of the 19th century.
The strategy of transfaith alliance among Christian minorities found an expres-
sion in the creation in 2013 of the organization In Defence of Christians (IDC),
that presents itself as a nonproﬁt and nonpartisan organization that seeks to raise
awareness among policy makers of the persecution of Middle East Christians. The
controversy that broke out in September 2014 about IDC’s ﬁrst congress shows
how the politicization of the issue of Middle East Christianity and its appropriation
by American conservative politicians may actually harm the cause of Middle East
Christians. Two events sparked the polemic about IDC. A week before the ﬁrst
congress, an article published in the Lebanese newspaper L’Orient Le Jour on
August 28, 2014, revealed that an important funder of the organization was Gilbert
Chaghouri, a Lebanese millionaire businessman based in Nigeria famous for his
close ties with pro-Assad Lebanese political actors. The implication of Chaghouri
in IDC cast doubt on the agenda of the organization and raised suspicions that the
whole conference was actually a cover up to promote the paradigm of “the alliance
of minorities” against Sunni Islam defended by Bashar Al Assad and vehemently
rejected in Lebanon by the 14 March Coalition. Members of IDC immediately pro-
tested against these accusations and insisted on the fact that the organization was
interested only in raising awareness against the threat to Christians (Zogby, 2014).
The keynote speech given by Senator Ted Cruz at the dinner organized by IDC on
September 12 triggered the other major scandal about IDC. When Ted Cruz con-
tended that Israel was the best ally of Middle East Christians, he was booed by a
large part of the audience. When, in response to this reaction, Ted Cruz insinuated
that the Christians from the Middle East were anti-Semite, he alienated an even
bigger part of the audience and caused the departure of Patriarch Laham, the spiri-
tual leader of the Melkite Greek Catholic Church. In other words, the alliance
between organizations from the Middle East Christian diaspora and American
conservatives comes with a cost for both sides. It also shows how conservative
groups and politicians ignore the complexity of Middle East Christianity.
Even though the main conferences organized by Arab Christian organizations in
the United States often serve to showcase the alliance with conservatives and pro-
ponents of anti-Islamist rhetoric, the views and strategies of supporters and mem-
bers of these groups are getting more and more diverse. Moreover, these groups
know how to adjust their message depending on the audience they target. Rallies
gathering former Muslims testifying of the violence of Muslim vigilantes against
Copts and converts to which controversial ﬁgures such as former priest Abuna
Zakaria Boutros (known for his ﬁerce critiques of Islam and the Quran) are invited
are often aimed mainly at an American audience. Copts are more likely to attend
more-moderate gatherings in which people speak to the struggles of Copts without
denigrating Muslims per se. Anti-Arab prejudice still largely disseminated in West-
ern media contributes to maintaining a certain degree of interreligious and inter-
ethnic solidarity among Arab-Americans from different backgrounds. The
members of the board of Coptic solidarity actually hold a range of views that is
much wider than those expressed at the annual conferences of 2013 and 2014.
Likewise, IDC has attracted a great variety of activists, politicians, and scholars,
some of them being genuinely interested in defending the rights of Christians in
the Middle East. The politicization of the issue of Middle Eastern Christianity and
its appropriation by conservatives in the United States is only one part of the story.
Some leaders of American Coptic groups have decided to give up their lobbying
activity in the United States and have gone back to Egypt after the revolution.
Michael Mounir, who founded the U.S. Copts Association in 1996 and was a key
actor in the lobbying for the adoption of IRFA, decided to go back to Egypt after
2010, where he founded a political party, al haya (Life). His departure is a response
to the opinion, now largely shared among Coptic activists in the United States, that
it is not advantageous to have links with U.S. administration and that the U.S. gov-
ernment cannot be trusted any more. The best way to act is from Egypt. According
to this view, only the Egyptian state and the new pope Tawadros II can be trusted.
A strong supporter of the coup—that he insists on calling a “revolution”—M.
Mounir describes Copts’ situation as a systematic persecution rather than as a
mere violation of rights. However, he claims that his party is open to people of all
faiths and that it seeks to defend the rights of all minorities, such as Shia and athe-
ists. He uses the term minority descriptively but refuses the notion that Copts
should be protected as such. On the contrary, he advocates for their recognition as
equal citizens with full rights. If he acknowledges that religious freedom has not
improved yet in Egypt, he is thankful to the military regime for the return of
security.
Although the gap between Copts in the United States and in Egypt has nar-
rowed after 2011, differences have persisted in the level of hatred for the Muslim
Brotherhood and in the level of support for Sissi. Right after the January Revolu-
tion, Copts in Egypt criticized the radicalism of some activists of the diaspora. The
role of Maurice Sadek in the promotion of the “Innocence of Muslims” was also
widely criticized. Even though both communities now agree on the fact that the
demise of Morsi has afforded a return to security and social cohesion that is beneﬁ-
cial for Copts, they assess very differently the nature of Sissi’s regime. While
Michael Mounir underlines the important role of Copts from the diaspora in
“countering the Muslim Brotherhood propaganda” aimed at presenting the events
of June–July 2013 as a “coup,” members of the Maspero Youth Union have a more
qualiﬁed judgment. They emphasize the role of the Coptic diaspora in raising
awareness and spreading information, but they are also more critical of their full
endorsement of the military regime. For example, they are critical of the very
warm and positive welcome they prepared to Sissi during his visit in New York for
the U.N. general summit in September 2014.
Conclusion
In this article, I have shown how the 2011 revolution in Egypt, followed by the
two successive regimes of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military-based rule of
Sissi, have created major changes in the organization and strategy of Coptic
organizations in the United States. Relatively inexperienced in political lobbying,
and quite unknown from the American public in the 1970s, Coptic organizations
have become more mainstream and have grown more open to the idea of build-
ing large transfaith coalitions with other Arab Christians in the United States.
Copts’ alliance with conservative politicians in the United States goes back to the
1990s. It has been reinforced by what Copts perceive as a lack of interest from
the Obama administration for the issue of minorities. However the arrival of a
younger generation in Coptic activism and the renewed connection with Copts
in Egypt and their reality has also contributed to the diversiﬁcation of points of
view and the emergence of more complex, rich, and nuanced analyses, notably
from Egyptian American experts of Coptic descent, who write about Copts but
don’t deﬁne Coptism as their sole identity (e.g., Michael Wahid Hanna at the
Century Foundation, Samuel Tadros at Hudson Institute, and Adel Iskandar).
Coptic organizations in the United States remain fragmented and centered
around key historical ﬁgures, but they are also undergoing a process of rapid pro-
fessionalization and of political learning, with some activists now invested in
building long-term relations with other Middle Eastern Christian organizations,
or with Copts in Egypt. Like Copts in Egypt, American Copts have adopted a
strategy of cautious waiting, in a dramatic context in which sectarian violence
against Christians rises in Egypt and in the entire Middle East. Copts, in the
United States as in Egypt, have to balance different emotions in the deﬁnition of
their strategy: the vivid memory of the Maspero massacre; resentment toward
what they see as a retaliation from the Muslim Brotherhood for Copts’ initial
support to Sissi; the realization that, despite the return of some degree of security
and social cohesion, the space for political expression and action is shrinking. In
Egypt and in the United States, Copts seem to be prisoners of highly polarized
political scenes. While the space for middle ground and for a dialogue between
Islamists and non-Islamists (whatever their religion) seems to have disappeared
for the moment from Egypt, polarization is, ironically, also an enduring trait of
American politics. The structural polarization of American politics, whereby any
topic comes to exist only through the lens of the left/right divide, does not make
the work of Middle East Christian organizations any easier. Commenting on the
Ted Cruz ﬁasco at IDC, New York Times columnist Ross Douhat perfectly sum-
marized this predicament, when he said that Middle East Christians are too
Christian for the left and too foreign for the right.
The political left in the West associates Christian faith with dead white male imperialism
… And in the Middle East the Israel-Palestine question, with its colonial overtones, has
been the left’s great obsession, whereas the less ideologically convenient plight of Christi-
ans under Islamic rule is often left untouched … Then, ﬁnally, there is the American
right, where one would expect those interests to ﬁnd a greater hearing. But the ancient
churches of the Middle East (Eastern Orthodox, Chaldean, Maronites, Copt, Assyrian)
are theologically and culturally alien to many American Catholics and evangelicals. And
the great cause of many conservative Christians in the United States is the state of Israel,
toward which many Arab Christians harbor feelings that range from the complicated to
the hostile. (Douhat, 2014)
In this context it’s important to refrain from too quickly condemning or con-
doning the strategy of Middle East Christian lobbies in the United States. Despite
its traditional unease with religion, the academic and political left should try to
invest and appropriate this discussion. Its engagement with this issue could con-
tribute to the elaboration of a much-needed new vocabulary that better accounts
for the complex reality of sectarian violence and interreligious relations in the Mid-
dle East. As shown by Mariz Tadros, the unease of Western academics and intellec-
tuals from the left have been reluctant to comment on the grievances of Christians
in the Middle East, for fear of coming across as supporters of the American hege-
monic project or of Islamophobic networks.
There is a fear among some that appearing to be defending religious pluralism in the mid-
dle east would be equated with the American hegemonic project, often perceived to be
strongly aligned with right wing Christian lobby groups. However, it is precisely the role
of the US in aligning, supporting and nurturing militant groups in Libya, Iraq and Syria
as a catalyst for the current existential threat to religious diversity in the region that we
need to bring to the forefront. There is no longer a “western us” versus the “Muslim
rest”—the entanglements of the US in deals and manoeuvrings with Islamist militants,
not least in Libya, Syria and Iraq cannot be overlooked. (M. Tadros, 2015)
Until the terms of the discussion shift, right-wing pundits and politicians will
continue adding fuel to the ﬁre by spreading Hollywood-like images and depoliti-
cized narratives of persecution, kidnappings, assaults, and killings.
Unfortunately, in the present context of increased repression in Egypt and of
radicalization of the violence perpetrated by ISIS throughout the Middle East, the
space for nuanced debate and appraisal of complexity seems to be shrinking every
day. Due to the growing insecurity and violence against Copts, the paradigm of
persecution and martyrdom has resurfaced. The discourse, promoted notably by
the Maspero Youth Union, on equal citizenship and political liberties, and the
critique of the authoritarianism of the Coptic clerical leadership over its faithful
has been replaced by the more traditional discourse on persecution and the need
for special protection by the state (Ezzat, 2015; M. Tadros, 2015). A security pact
between President Sissi and the pope Tawadros, echoing the pact between Mou-
barak and Shenouda, has been formulated to ensure the security of the Copts in
exchange for the compliance of the Copts with the new authoritarian regime.
But, as shown by Georges Fahmi, the return to the old approach may bring nega-
tive consequences. Not only does it further delay the full implementation of full
citizenship, it also perpetuates a system of backdoor channels to resolve conﬂicts
about the rights of Copts. But “by encouraging Church members to depend on
Coptic leaders to channel their political and social demands, this approach deep-
ens Copts’ isolation and discourages them from joining political parties or move-
ments” (Fahmi, 2015). As a consequence, this perspective “hinders their
interaction with other political forces and their integration into civil and political
society, leaving Copts engaged only with activities organized by the Church”
(Fahmi, 2015). In view of the political developments of Egypt, an important chal-
lenge for Coptic organizations in the United States will be to decide whether they
want to echo the strategy of the Church or create a pluralistic space for debate
and critique of the Sissi regime, and thus risk jeopardizing the precarious security
pact between the Church and the state.
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